



Water System Vulnerability Assessment Update

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HQ IMA WSVa Submission Policy Memo

The HQ IMA released a policy memorandum dated 8 Jan 04 (enclosed), instructing the IMA Regions ensure their applicable Army Installations submit WSVa reports and related documentation (WSVa and ERP certification forms) to the EPA by the 30 June 04 SDWA deadline. The memorandum also points out that assistance is available from USACHPPM.

As USACHPPM Project Officers, you'll need to be aware of this memorandum. Installations may come to you for guidance. The last WSVa Newsletter provided some good general guidance on submitting WSVa reports and related documentation (enclosed). Contact the USACHPPM WSMP (Steve Clarke) if you have any questions (DSN: 584-7746).

DHS Visiting Water Systems

The American Water Works Association (AWWA) learned that teams contracted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have been visiting several water systems, in addition to chemical facilities and other critical facilities to gain a better understanding of vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. The teams, known as High Value Target Unit (HVTU) Teams, are asking to view vulnerability assessments at water systems. The AWWA wants water systems to be aware that they are not required to release any information contained in their vulnerability assessment to anyone other than the administrator of the EPA.

Because DOD water system vulnerability assessments are classified secret, Army installations visited by an HVTU Team should contact their installation security office to verify the credentials of the team members, discuss terms of the visit, and decide whether information in the vulnerability assessment should be shared.

EPA ETV Verification of Rapid Toxicity Tests

The EPA recently concluded testing and evaluation of seven rapid toxicity monitoring and detection systems. The testing and evaluation was designed to test the ability of the seven technologies to detect – and provide results in less than an hour – selected toxic threat contaminants in water and determine their susceptibility to commonly occurring but potentially interfering compounds and matrices. The toxic threat contaminants included aldicarb, colchicine, cyanide, dicrotophos, thallium sulfate, botulinum toxin, ricin, soman, and VX. The interfering compounds included aluminum, copper, iron, manganese, and zinc (all commonly occurring metals in drinking water).

These monitoring and detection systems are not intended to be used to identify a specific contaminant or to measure the amount of contaminant. Instead, they are to be used to provide a relatively quick analysis of a water sample to determine whether a contaminant exists in a quantity that could pose a risk to consumers. These are not fail-safe technologies. Test results indicated numerous false positive and negative results. These technologies should not be used alone to confirm the presence or absence of a toxic contaminant. Rather, they should be used in conjunction with other analytical methods. Specifics of the testing results can be found at

http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/pdfs/fs_security_rapid-tox.pdf.

As project officers, just be aware of these technologies and utilize this information in your discussions concerning monitoring devices with Installation personnel. They are not fail-safe and should be used with great caution. Only recommend use of these devices if the water system operators have an excellent handle on the variable water quality throughout their distribution system via frequent monitoring at numerous locations of common parameters (disinfectant residual, temperature, turbidity, bacteriological, conductivity, etc.). Even then these devices should only be used in conjunction with proven confirmation methods.

